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Conclusion ...........................................
I.

636

INTRODUCTION

Effective September 1, 1983, article 342-705 of the Texas Banking
Code was amended to limit the required disclosure by a Texas bank of
"the amount deposited by any depositor or records of accounts or
other bank records" to certain specific situations.' In addition, two
new sections were added to establish a procedure whereby any party
attempting to obtain an order, subpoena, or request for "the disclosure, examination, or production of records of deposits or accounts
and other bank records" must give notice to the customer of the
bank.' This notice is to be accompanied by a certification to the bank
1. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Section 1 of
article 342-705 was amended to read as follows:
Section 1. No bank shall be required to recognize the claim of any third party to any
deposit, or withhold payment of any deposit to the depositor or to his order, unless and
until the bank is served with citation or other appropriate process issuing out of a court of
competent jurisdiction in connection with a suit instituted by such third party for the
purpose of recovering or establishing an interest in such deposit; neither shall any bank be
required to disclose or produce to third parties, or permit third parties to examine the
amount deposited by any depositor or records of accounts or other bank records except (i)
where the depositor or owner of such deposit or other bank customer as to whom records
of accounts or other bank records are to be disclosed is a proper or necessary party to a
proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction in which event the records pertaining to
the deposits, accounts, or other bank transactions of such depositor, owner, or customer
shall be subject to disclose or (ii) where the bank itself is a proper or necessary party to a
proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction or (iii) in response to a subpoena issued by
a legislative investigating committee of the Legislature of Texas, or (iv) in response to a
request for examination of its records by the Attorney General of Texas pursuant to Article 1302-5.01 et. seq. of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act.
Id.
2. See id. §§ 2, 3. Sections 2 and 3, added in 1983, read as follows:
Sec. 2. Unless ordered otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, before disclosure,
production, or examination may be required under Section 1 of the article, the agency,
body, or party issuing or obtaining the order, subpoena, or request for the disclosure,
examination, or production of records of deposits or accounts and other bank records
shall (1) give notice of such order, subpoena, or request to the depositor or bank customer
by personally serving the depositor or customer with a copy thereof or by mailing a copy
thereof to the depositor or customer by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 10
days preceding the date when compliance with the order, subpoena, or request is required,
and (2) certify to the bank (at the time the order, subpoena, or request is served or delivered to the bank) that the depositor or bank customer has been served with or has been
mailed a copy of the order, subpoena, or request as required herein. A bank shall be
entitled to recover reasonable costs of reproduction which it incurs in complying with
orders, subpoenas, and requests for the disclosure, examination, or production of records
of deposits or accounts and other bank records. The bank may notify its customers or
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that such notice has been given at least ten days preceding the date
when compliance with the order, subpoena, or request is required.'
The limitations on required disclosures by Texas banks in amended
article 342-705 were intended to give Texas banks a protected area in
which to operate. It does not, however, restrict a bank from making
"voluntary" disclosures of bank information regarding the customer.
Because of its failure to deal with the limits of voluntary disclosure,
amended article 342-705 not only leaves unresolved the question of
what are the present rights of the bank customer as to financial record
privacy, but also what should be the reasonable expectations of the
customer of any depository institution with regard to financial record
privacy, be it a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union. In
other words, when should the customer be able to prevent a third
party from obtaining his financial records from his depository institution, whether or not the4 depository institution wants to disclose the
contents of the records?
This article will first analyze amended article 342-705 and will then
attempt to fit it into the larger context of recurring financial privacy
issues, which may be grouped roughly into four broad issues: (1)
what rights does the customer have to prevent disclosure in the course
of an investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense?, (2) what statutory limitations exist regarding disclosure?, (3) what common law
rights to confidentiality can the customer assert?, and (4) what self
policing by depository institutions exists in regard to giving out finandepositor (unless ordered otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction) of its receipt of
any subpoena, order, or request for production.
Sec. 3. Each customer or depositor to whom notice of an order, subpoena, or request for
disclosure, examination, or production of records of deposits or accounts or other bank
records may, prior to the date specified therein for disclosure, examination, or production,
file in an appropriate district court of the State of Texas a motion to quash the order,
subpoena, or request or for protective order and shall make personal service of such motion on the party, agency, or body issuing or obtaining such order, subpoena, or request
and on the bank prior to the date for disclosure, examination, or production. Any motion
to quash or for protection shall be verified. Failure to file and serve such motion to quash
or for protection shall constitute consent for all purposes to disclosure, production, or
examination made pursuant to this article.
Id.
3. See id. § 2.
4. The limitations of amended article 342-705 do not extend to disclosure in the course of
investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses. See id. amendatory act § 3. Article 342-705,
prior to its amendment in 1983, was held to be preempted by federal statutes, such as the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and the I.R.C., where applicable. See Jacobson v. Citizen
State Bank, 587 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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cial records? sNext, this article will attempt to set forth some arguments as to how far the customer's privacy rights in his financial
records should extend. Such examination will explore the differences,
if any, which should be made between accounts records, financial
statements, and loan records. Finally, this article will attempt to
place the financial privacy question in the larger context of general
privacy issues presented by our increasingly technological and complex society. In so doing, it will summarize the current status of privacy protection laws both within the United States and abroad and
the movements for and against more regulation.
II.

AMENDED ARTICLE

342-705

The 1983 amendment to article 342-705 was intended to establish
the procedural rights and duties of various parties when any information is requested from a bank about its customer.5 The prior version
of article 342-705 was much more limited in several respects. 6 First,
it only applied to the situation where a third party was claiming an
interest in a deposit and/or was attempting to obtain information regarding the amount deposited with the bank.7 The amended version
of article 342-705 clearly applies on its face to all "other bank
records," which presumably would include loan records and financial
5. At least this was the intent of the Banking Law Committee of the State Bar, which
drafted amended article 342-705. The author was chairman of this committee; however, most
of the credit for drafting and revising the amendment should go to Scott J. Sheehan of Houston, Professor Bob Wood of Lubbock, Gene Huff of Amarillo, and George E. Henderson of
Austin.
6. Prior to its amendment in 1983, article 342-705 had read as follows:
No bank shall be required to recognize the claim of any third party to any deposit, or
withhold payment of any deposit to the depositor or to his order, unless and until the
bank is served with citation or other appropriate process issuing out of a court of competent jurisdiction in connection with a suit instituted by such third party for the purpose of
recovering or establishing an interest in such deposit; neither shall any bank be required to
disclose the amount deposited by any depositor to third parties except where (i) the depositor or owner of such deposit is a proper or necessary party to a proceeding in a court of
competent jurisdiction in which event the records pertaining to the deposit of such depositor or owner shall be subject to disclosure or (ii) the bank itself is a proper or necessary
party to a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction or (iii) in response to a subpoena issued by a legislative investigating committee of the Legislature of Texas, or (iv) in
response to a request for examination of its records by the Attorney General of Texas
pursuant to Article 1302-5.01 et. seq. of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act.
Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 440, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1135, 1135-36, amended by TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
7. See id.
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statements, as well as account records.'

Secondly, amended article

342-705 requires the person seeking production of records to give
prior notice to the customer and to certify to the bank that it has
given such notice.9 This procedure is modeled after the procedure

found in several federal statutes, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 discussed later in this article. Thirdly, section 2
added to amended article 342-705 now allows the bank to recover
reasonable reproduction costs which are incurred in complying with
"orders, subpoenas, and requests for the disclosure, examination, or
production of records of deposits or accounts and other bank
records.""0 Finally, section 3 added to amended article 342-705 specifically gives the customer the right to file a motion to quash the

order, subpoena, or request, and if he. fails to do so, he is deemed to
have consented to the disclosure, production, or examination of his
bank records. 1

As noted above, amended article 342-705 does allow the bank to
recover the reasonable reproduction costs incurred. This is an important feature from the bank's standpoint, largely because it should
limit unreasonable requests. It is presumed that the bank would have
to apply to a court to compel payment of such costs if the party seeking the records fails to voluntarily pay them. At that point, the court

would determine the reasonableness of the costs if such issues were
raised.
8. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
9. See id. § 2.
10. See id. § 2.

11. See id. § 3. By way of background, it is interesting to note that the amendment to
article 342-705 was introduced as part of the State Bar Legislative Program for 1983. The
legislation was drafted by the Banking Law Committee (now the Financial Institutions Committee) of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the State Bar of Texas. It
was introduced as part of Senate bill 429, which also amended article 342-701 of the Texas

Banking Code relating to the definition of depository contracts. See Act of June 19, 1983, ch.
525, Tex. Gen. Laws 3056, 3056-60 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-701 &
342-705 (Vernon Supp. 1984)). It is appropriate that such amendment would be proposed by
the State Bar of Texas, and not by the banking industry, inasmuch as it is largely a procedural
proposal which merely attempts to set up an orderly procedure for banks to comply with
requests for information about the bank's customer. There is little, if anything, in the amendment to article 342-705 which attempts to regulate the substantive rights of either the bank or
its customer in regard to what financial records may be disclosed. That this is largely a neutral
procedural proposal which also assists the customer is attested by the fact that consumer lobbyists were aware of the amendment and did not oppose it. The hearings on this amendment
were attended by Jim Broyle, a consumer lobbyist from Austin, and Consumer Credit Commissioner Sam Kelley, among others.
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While amended article 342-705 does not actually address the substantive issues of disclosure, the 1983 Amendatory Act (S.B. 429) provides that a bank is not restricted in its use or disclosure of
information under section 3V12 Such disclosure, however, must be
made (1) in good faith in the usual course of the bank's financial business; (2) in the course of litigation affecting the bank's interest; or (3)
with the express or implied consent of the customer."3 It is common
practice to attempt to discover bank records in relation to many lawsuits, such as divorce actions or business disputes, and, as a result, the
requirement of giving at least ten days notice before discovery of bank
records has caught more than one Texas trial lawyer by surprise since
September 1, 1983. One saving grace for the trial attorney caught
unaware of the time limitation is that section 2 of amended article
342-705 allows a court of competent jurisdiction to shorten this period if necessary. 14 Of course, the better practice is to start discovery
far enough before a trial setting so that the ten day notice period
presents no problem, rather than rely on the mercy of a trial judge at
the last minute.
Amended article 342-705 is merely a procedural statute and does
not address substantive issues regarding financial privacy. 5 It is
modeled after federal statutory limitations on disclosure of bank
records to governmental agencies or authorities, which are also

12. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, amendatory act § 3 (Vernon Supp.
1984).
13. See id. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1983 amendatory act provide as follows:
Sec. 3. This Act shall not restrict or apply to amendment of depository contracts, addition of new terms or provisions to depository contracts, or disclosure or production of
deposits or of records of accounts and other banks records where such amendment, addi-

tion, or disclosure is made under or in substantial compliance with applicable federal laws
or regulations. This Act shall not restrict or apply to the use or disclosure by a bank of

information or records pertaining to deposits, accounts, or bank transactions where such
use or disclosure is made in good faith in the usual course of the financial business of the
bank, is made by the bank in the course of the litigation affecting its interests, or is made

with express or implied consent of the depositor or customer. The provisions of this act
shall not apply to the investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses.
Sec. 4. Failure of the depositor or bank customer to receive any notice given under this
Act respecting a depository contract or any copy of a subpoena, request, or other order
shall not render the same ineffective where such was mailed or served as provided herein.
Id. §§ 3, 4.
14. See id. § 2.
15. See id. § 3 (customer may file motion to quash; failure to file shall constitute consent
for disclosure).
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largely procedural.1 6 Before analyzing such federal statutes, however,
it is necessary to first sketch out the overall framework of financial
privacy issues as they have developed to date.
III.

DISCLOSURE OF BANK RECORDS IN THE CRIMINAL AREA

One of the most litigated areas regarding financial records lies in
the criminal realm." Such records can be of vital importance in
many criminal trials. It does not take much imagination for a defense
criminal attorney to contend that the customer of the bank has protection against "search and seizure" of his bank records under the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
In the leading case of United States v. Miller,1" Miller, the defend-

ant, was convicted of operating an unregistered, unbonded still in
Georgia. Miller had the bad luck of having a fire break out in a warehouse he had rented. In the course of putting out the fire, the firemen
discovered a 7500 gallon distillery along with 175 gallons of nontaxed whiskey and related whiskey-making equipment. Miller sought
to suppress evidence, including bank records, of his relationship with
several Georgia banks. Although Treasury agents obtained a subpoena which was defectively issued, the Georgia banks permitted the
Treasury agents to examine microfilmed records and obtain copies.
As is often done, this was permitted by the banks without notification
to the defendant. 9 The records involved were not only account
records and loan records but also Miller's financial statements.20 The
government contended, before the United States Supreme Court, that
16. See I.R.C. §§ 7609, 7610 (CCH 1984); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A.

§§ 552-552b (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 34013422 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667c
(West 1982 & Supp. 1984); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (West

1982 & Supp. 1984); 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.16-.19 (1984). Due to the fact that several statutes cited in
this article have been amended subsequent to the most recent U.S.C. supplement, all citations
will be made to the U.S.C.A.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976) (respondent charged with
several federal criminal offenses made motion to suppress records relating to bank accounts);
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 41 (1974) (issuance of subpoena to obtain
bank records in criminal prosecution); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 F. 142, 143 (S.D.
Ala. 1924) (I.R.S. summons directed to third-party bank), aft'd, 267 U.S. 576 (1925).
18. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
19. See id. at 436-38. This was probably done because the bank officers were told that
they would not need to appear at the scheduled time before the grand jury if they allowed the
Treasury Agents to make their examination of the records. See id. at 438.
20. See id. at 438.
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Miller had no fourth amendment interest permitting him to challenge
the validity of the subpoena.2" The Supreme Court upheld the government's position and stated:
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment interest in the
records kept by the banks because they are merely copies of personal
records that were made available to the banks for a limited purpose and
in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He relies on this
Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353.

.

.that a

'search and seizure' become[s] unreasonable when the Government's
activities violate 'the privacy upon which [a person] justifiably relie[s].'
But in Katz the Court also stressed that '[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public.

. .

is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-

tection.' [W]e perceive no legitimate 'expectation of privacy' in [the
contents of] checks and deposits. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, includingfinancial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.22
Although the Miller decision raised a furor in the United States
Congress, it was not surprising in light of the earlier Supreme Court
case of CaliforniaBankers Association v. Schultz. In CaliforniaBankers Association,23 the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the Bank Secrecy Act under a fourth amendment challenge.24 In
doing so, the Court stated:
Since we hold that the mere maintenance of the records by the banks
under the compulsion of the regulations invaded no Fourth Amendment right of any depositor, plaintiff's attack on the record keeping requirements under that Amendment fails. That the bank in making the
records required by the Secrecy acts under the compulsion of the regu21. See id. at 439. In addition, the government claimed that the court of appeals erred in
finding defects in the subpoena and in holding that the appropriate remedy was suppression of
the evidence. See id. at 439.
22. See id. at 442 (emphasis added).
23. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
24. See id. at 54. The Bank Secrecy Act, despite its title, is not a "privacy" enhancing
law. Rather, the Act, passed in 1970, requires financial institutions and other persons involved
in financial transactions to maintain copies of checks and other records and to report financial
transactions to the Secretary of the Treasury. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959
(West 1980); 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1984); 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 53165322 (West 1983).
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lation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it neither searches
nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment
right.2 5
This is not to say that the federal courts would not apply the first
and/or fifth amendments of the United States Constitution to block
disclosure of bank records in extreme circumstances, such as where
the government seeks bank records to determine political or religious
affiliations. 26 However, the absence of a general federal constitutional
right of confidentiality or privacy in banking records, as held by the
United States Supreme Court, resulted in the enactment of several
major federal statutes that either directly or indirectly affect financial
privacy. 27 Texas' amended article 342-705 and other state statutes are
modeled after these federal statutes in part, and an examination of
them in some detail is necessary to properly fit amended article 342705 into the overall context of financial record privacy.
IV.

FEDERAL STATUTES

Two major federal statutes addressing the issue of access by federal
agencies to confidential bank records were passed in direct response to
the Miller decision.2" These were the Tax Reform Act of 197629 (sections 7609 and 7610) and the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978. 3 o These two acts will be analyzed in some detail. The Federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act,3 affecting personal financial privacy, had
25. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974).
26. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.), affd per curiarn, 393 U.S.
14 (1968). In this case, the court enjoined the enforcement of subpoenas issued by a prosecutor
for checking account records of the State Republican Party. The court based its decision on
the first amendment. See id. at 256-57. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, however, will not usually protect a person from the disclosure of records held by a third
party recordkeeper. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976).
27. See I.R.C. §§ 7609, 7610 (CCH 1984) (1976 Tax Reform Act); 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 34013422 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984) (Financial Privacy Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9306 (Financial
Privacy Act passed in response to Miller); R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch.
3, at 2-3 (1983) (sections 7609 and 7610 of Tax Reform Act stem from Miller).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9306 (Financial Privacy Act passed in response to Miller); R.
FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 3, at 2-3 (1983) (sections 7609 and 7610 of
Tax Reform Act stem from Miller). This book is an excellent detailed analysis of all the
provisions of the various financial privacy statutes, both federal and state.
29. I.R.C. §§ 7609, 7610 (CCH 1984).
30. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984).
31. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667c (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
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already been passed in 1970 in the wave of consumer legislation which
followed the passage of the Federal Truth in Lending Act in 1968.32
A complete analysis of all the provisions of this complex statute is
beyond the scope of this article; however, its impact on financial record privacy will additionally be discussed. Also, several other federal
statutes which indirectly affect financial privacy, such as the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 33 the Freedom of Information Act, 34 and
the laws and regulations affecting the disclosure of bank examination
reports,35 will be discussed.
A.

The Tax Reform Act of 1976

Sections 7609 and 7610 of the Internal Revenue Code were added
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.36 This was the first major federal
statute to address the issue of access by federal agencies to confidential bank records and was passed in direct response to the Miller decision. 37 As will be discussed, the tax privacy provisions of the I.R.C.
are generally similar to those now found in the Financial Privacy
Act. 38 The tax privacy provisions protect the records of individuals
and virtually all legal entities. 39 The basic statutory scheme requires
that the federal government provide the taxpayer with notice of a
summons which orders a third party to disclose information on the
taxpayer.' There is then a waiting period during which the taxpayer
may prevent disclosure.4 1 These provisions do contain certain exceptions to the general rule of notice, including provisions for John Doe
32. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1614, 1631-1646, 1661-1665a, 1666-1666j, 1667-1667e (West
1982 & Supp. 1984) (Truth in Lending Act).
33. Id. §§ 1693-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
34. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552-552b (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
35. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.16-.19 (1984).
36. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1525, 1699-1703 (1976) (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 7609-7610 (CCH 1984)).
37. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 3, at 2 (1983).
38. See id. at 3.
39. Any "person" whose records are held by a third-party recordkeeper is protected by
the tax privacy provisions. See I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1)(A), (B) (CCH 1984). The word "person"
is broadly defined in the I.R.C. to include "an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation." See id. § 7701(a)(1).
40. See id. § 7609(a)(1). Such notice must be given to the taxpayer within three days of
the summons or 23 days before the records are to be produced, whichever is less. See id.
§ 7609(a)(1).
41. See id. § 7609(b)(2)(A). The taxpayer has a right to begin a proceeding to quash the
summons within 20 days after he receives the notice from the government. See id.
§ 7609(b)(2)(A).
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summonses in specified exigencies, 42 but they do not contain the numerous and complex exceptions found in the Financial Privacy Act.
If a depository institution concludes that a summons is not governed by the I.R.C. tax privacy provisions and that other privacy laws
are not relevant, then the depository institution may comply with the
summons according to its own policies.4" In practice, however, many
times the depository institution is uncertain of the application of the
tax privacy provisions. In these cases it may want to take more precautions. The depository institution could notify the customer of the
subpoena or summons and the stated compliance date." In addition,
the depository institution could ask the I.R.S. agent to confirm in
writing that the bank or the particular summons is not bound by the
tax privacy provisions of the I.R.C.4 5 The problem with this alternative, however, is that the I.R.S. agent will probably be reluctant to do
so. 46 Finally, the depository institution could provide the records requested by the I.R.S. in a sealed envelope with a form cover letter
instructing the I.R.S. not to open the sealed envelope until it has determined that the tax privacy provisions are inapplicable or that an
exemption applies.47
One of the major innovations of the tax privacy provisions added to
the I.R.C. was the amendment to section 7610, which allowed persons
with third party summonses to recover certain costs of complying
with such summonses.4 8 The I.R.C. specifically provides "reimbursement for such costs that are reasonably necessary which have been
directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or transporting books,
papers, records, or other data required to be produced by summons." 49 As noted earlier, this is the model followed by amended

42. See id. § 7609(g). Other examples of summonses which the tax privacy provisions do
not cover are those issued solely to determine the identity of a person with a numbered account, see id. § 7609(c)(2)(A), those served on a taxpayer whose tax liability is at issue, see id.
§ 7609(a)(4)(A), those issued to collect the tax liability of a taxpayer determined by assessment
or judgment to owe an amount, see id. § 7609(c)(2)(B)(i), and those issued in exigent circumstances following ex parte judicial proceedings, see id. § 7609(g).
43. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 3, at 14 (1983).
44. See id. at
45. See id. at
46. See id.at
47. See id. at

14.
14.
14.
15.

48. See I.R.C. § 7610 (CCH 1984).
49. Id. § 7610(a)(2).
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article 342-705.s 0
On some occasions, the depository institution may wish to contest
compliance with a subpoena for reasons of its own, whether or not the
customer also has objections. The principal reasons why the bank
might object are insufficient description of the record sought, insufficient description of the customer, and overbreath.5 1 The depository
institution must weigh the probable cost of the enforcement proceeding against the probable cost of compliance, less the reimbursement
expected under the I.R.C. in determining whether to raise an "undue
burden" defense. Furthermore, the depository institution is very unlikely to recover any attorney's fees incurred in raising an "undue
burden" defense.52
B.

The Right to FinancialPrivacy Act

The second major federal statute passed in reaction to the Miller
decision was the Financial Privacy Act, which regulates the divulgence of financial records to agencies and departments of the United
States government.5 3 Basically, financial institutions are prohibited
from providing access to the financial records of any customer of the
financial institution to a federal authority, except in accordance with
the provisions of the Act.54 The federal authority seeking the records
must give a written certification to the financial institution that it
complied with the applicable provisions of the Act.55 As opposed to
the broader coverage of the Tax Reform Act, a "customer" covered
by the Financial Privacy Act "means an individual or partnership of
five or fewer individuals. ' 56 Financial record "means an original of, a
copy of, or information known to have been derived from, any record
50. Compare id. § 7610(a)(2) (reimbursement for reasonable cost of reproducing records)
with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (stating "[a] bank
shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs of reproduction which it incurs in complying with
orders, subpoenas, and requests for the disclosure, examination, or production of records of

deposits or accounts and other bank records").
51. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 3, at 50 (1983).

52. See id. at 52.
53. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984).
54. See id. § 3402 (West 1980).
55. See id. §§ 3402, 3404-3408.
56. See id. § 3401(4), (5). Actually, this is the definition of a "person". See id. § 3401(4).
Subsection 5, however, defines "customer" as "any person or authorized representative of that
person who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom a financial
institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account maintained in the
person's name." Id. § 3401(5). Compare id. § 3401(4), (5) (person is "individual or partner-
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held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship
with [it] . . . .,, There are at least eleven exceptions to the general
procedures of the Financial Privacy Act. 58
Three requirements under the Financial Privacy Act must be satisfied for the government authority to obtain financial records pursuant
to an administrative subpoena or summons. First, the subpoena or
summons must be authorized by law; second, the records sought must
be relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; and third, the
government must follow a specified procedure when obtaining the
ship of five or fewer individuals") with I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (CCH 1984) (broad definition of
person as "an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation").
57. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3410 (2) (West 1980).
58. The exceptions are as follows: 1. Notifying a federal authority that a financial institution or its officers, employees or agents has information that "may be relevant to a possible
violation of any statute or regulation." See id. § 3403(c). This exception, however, does not
appear to permit giving the information itself until the federal authority complies with the Act.
2. "Providing copies of any financial record to any court or federal authority as an incident to
perfecting a security interest, proving a claim in bankruptcy, or otherwise collecting on a debt
[owed] either to the financial institution itself or in its role as a fiduciary." Id. § 3403(d)(1). 3.
Providing any financial record necessary to permit the authority to carry out its responsibilities
incident to processing an application for assistance to a customer in the form of a federal loan,
loan guaranty, or loan insurance agreement, or as an incident to processing a default on, or
administering, a federal guaranteed or insured loan. See id. § 3403(d)(2). 4. Disclosing financial records that are not "identified with or identifiable as being derived from the financial
records of a particular customer." See id. § 3413(a). 5. "Examination by or disclosure to any
supervisory agency of financial records or information in the exercise of its supervisory, regulatory, or monetary functions with respect to a financial institution." Id. § 3413(b). The term
supervisory agencies includes "any of the following that have statutory authority to examine
the financial condition or business operations of the [financial] institution:" § 3401(6) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board; the National Credit Union Administration; the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Comptroller of the Currency; the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Bank Secrecy Act
and the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act; and any state banking or securities
department or agency. See id. § 3401(6). 6. "Disclosure of financial records in accordance
with procedures authorized by the Internal Revenue Code." Id. § 3413(c). 7. "Providing
financial records or information required to be reported in accordance with any federal statute
or rule promulgated thereunder." Id. § 3413(d). 8. "Financial records sought by a federal
authority under the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or comparable rules of other
courts in connection with litigation to which the Government authority and customer are
parties." Id. § 3413(e). 9. Financial records sought by a federal authority "pursuant to an
administrative subpoena issued by an administrative law judge in an adjudicatory proceeding
subject to" 5 U.S.C. § 544 and to which the federal authority and the customer are parties. See
id. § 3413(0. 10. "Any subpoena or court order issued in connection with proceedings before
a grand jury." Id. § 3413(i). 11. "Financial records sought by the General Accounting Office
pursuant to an authorized proceeding, investigation, examination or audit directed at a government authority." Id. § 34130).
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records. 59 This procedure involves the now familiar pattern of customer notification, a waiting period, and an opportunity for the customer to contest disclosure before it occurs.
The Financial Privacy Act also permits customer authorization for
disclosures of financial records and allows the government authority
6
to obtain customer financial records by the use of a search warrant. 0
A government authority may also obtain customer records under the
Act through the use of a judicial subpoena. 6 1 The legislative history
of the Act makes it clear that financial institutions may ignore formal
written requests for customer information with impunity unless they
are enforced by some other formal legal process. 62 A government authority, however, may use a formal written request technique if it does
not reasonably appear to have available to it some other administrative summons or subpoena authority to obtain financial records for
the purposes for which they are sought. 63 Such formal written request must be authorized by regulations promulgated by the agency
seeking the records. 64 In response to this requirement, several federal
departments and agencies have proposed a promulgated formal regulation providing for a formal written request. These agencies include
the Department of Defense,65 the Inspection Service Authority of the
Postal Service,6 6 the Department of Justice,67 and the Department of

the Treasury.68
The most important provision of the Financial Privacy Act for financial institutions is section 3403(b). This section prohibits financial
institutions from releasing customer records until the government authority seeking the records provides written certification to the financial institution that it has complied with the appropriate provisions of
the Act. 69 The most important provision of the Act for customers is
section 3410, which prescribes a procedure whereby a customer may
59. See id. § 3405.

60. See id. §§ 3404, 3406.
61. See id. § 3407.
62. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (92 Stat. 3641) 9273, 9322.

63.
64.
65.
66.

See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408(1) (West 1980).
See id. § 3408(2).
See 32 C.F.R. § 294.9(b) (1984).
See 39 C.F.R. § 233.5(c) (1984).

67. See 28 C.F.R. § 47.4 (1984).

68. See 31 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1984).
69. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (West 1980).
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challenge a government order or request for records.7° This procedure is the only judicial remedy available to a customer to prevent
disclosure of the customer's financial records under the Act.7 1
There are several limitations to the Financial Privacy Act. The Act
does not apply to requests for orders for information by state and
73
local government agencies 72 and does not affect an I.R.S. summons.
In addition, it has been held that the Act does not preclude
discovery
74
of the bank customer's transactions in a civil suit.
Following the model of the Tax Reform Act, section 3415 of the
Financial Privacy Act provides for reimbursement by the federal government of certain costs of compliance.75 In accordance with this
statutory authority, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated Regulation S, prescribing the rates and conditions for reimbursement.76
The policy behind this reimbursement of costs is to promote prompt
and efficient compliance by financial institutions with federal requests
for information.
C.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

The Fair Credit Reporting Act 77 was passed in the wave of consumer legislation that followed the enactment of the Truth in Lending
Act in 1968.78 It constitutes a "privacy" act in the sense that it restricts the dissemination of "written, oral or other communication of
any information.

. .

bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness...

for (1) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
70. See id.§ 3410.
71. See id. § 3410(e); R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 2, at 39 (1983).
72. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (West 1980).
73. See id.§ 3413(c); United States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 1979); McTaggart v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
74. See Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Clement, 87 F.R.D. 569, 570-71 (D. Md. 1980) (Financial Privacy Act provides no justification for bank's noncompliance with subpoena issued in
civil action).
75. See § 12 U.S.C.A. § 3415 (West 1980). According to this section, the government
shall pay the financial institution "assembling or providing financial records pertaining to a
customer . . . a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which
have been directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or transporting books, papers,
records, or other data required or requested to be produced." See id.
76. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 219.1-.7 (1984).
77. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1127,
1127-36 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681t) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984)).
78. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1614, 1631-1646, 1661-1665a, 1666-1666j, 1667-1667e (West
1982 & Supp. 1984) (Truth in Lending Act).
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household purposes, [in a 'consumer report' by a consumer reporting
agency]. .

. ."I'

The Fair Credit Reporting Act is aimed at credit

bureaus and similar institutions and is intended to force them to
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting with the commercial need
for information in a manner that is fair and equitable to the consumer.8 0 In effect, the Act provides minimum standards for the collection and maintenance of credit data and gives consumers the right
to have access to correct their files.81 The consumer is also given the
right to have summaries of any disputes with the credit reporting
agencies and certain updated information delivered to the depository
institution.82
Section 1681 a(d) excludes from "consumer report[s]" those reports
of "information solely as to transactions" with the consumer.83 A
depository institution can generally avoid being classified as a "consumer reporting agency" by limiting the information it furnishes to
others to that reflecting only its direct experience with the customers.
The depository institution, however, can very easily become an inadvertent consumer reporting agency. This occurs if the depository institution provides consumer reports it obtains from credit bureaus to
other financial institutions dealing with the same customer, even if
this is done at the request of, or to accommodate, its customer.84 A
holding company subsidiary bank may be deemed to be a consumer
reporting agency if it regularly transfers credit applications, or information in them, to a separate bank subsidiary of the same holding
company. 85 The "joint user" exception does allow a creditor, without
86
becoming a consumer reporting agency, to transmit non-experience
information to a "joint user" of the information. 7
The main effect on depository institutions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is that a depository institution may be held liable for ob79. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(d) (West 1982).
80. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (Stat.) 4394, 4395.
81. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681i (West 1982).

82. See id.
83. See id. § 1681a(d).
84. See 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE

11,203, q. 19 (CCH 1971).

85. See id. q. 17.
86. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(d).
87. See 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE

11,307, q. 4 (CCH 1971). As used in this excep-

tion, a "joint user" is another party involved in the same transaction. See id. q. 4.
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taining consumer reports improperly."8 The basic coverage of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act allows a consumer reporting agency to prepare a consumer report (1) in reply to the order of a court with jurisdiction to issue such an order, (2) in accordance with the consumer's
written instructions, and (3) for one or more of five specified "permissible purposes."8 9
The depository institution often accesses the credit reporting
agency's credit files directly through use of a computer terminal located on the institution's own premises. Often the depository institution will only make a general representation to the credit reporting
agency at the start of their relationship that it will only obtain consumer reports for "permissible purposes." Since the credit reporting
agency does not actually review or question the purposes to which
each consumer report is being obtained, the depository institution
may end up being liable for obtaining consumer reports improperly. 90
The principal duty of'a user of a consumer report or other nonexperience information is to notify the consumer of adverse action
taken on the basis of that information. 91 Although the notification

88. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n, 1681o (West 1982). Section 1681n pertains to civil liability for willful noncompliance and states that "[a]ny consumer reporting agency or user of
information which willfully fails to comply with any requirement . . . with respect to any
consumer is liable to that consumer" for any actual damages, any punitive damages which may
be allowed by the court, and any court costs and attorney's fees. See id. § 1681n. Section
1681o pertains to civil liability for negligent noncompliance and is similar to § 1681n except
that no punitive damages are recoverable. See id. § 1681o.
89. See id. § 1681b. If the person requesting the consumer report meets one of the following requirements, then the report will be issued:
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the
consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extention of
credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer's
eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a
business transaction involving the consumer.
See id. § 1681b (3).
90. See id. § 1681n.
91. See id. § 1681m. This section makes a distinction in the requirements for adverse
action taken based on reports of consumer reporting agencies and adverse action based on
reports of persons other than consumer reporting agencies. In the former situation, the consumer must be notified of the adverse action and be given the name and address of the agency
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requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act overlap the similar requirements of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 92 and Regulation
B, 9 3 the two sets of requirements are not identical. 94 The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B apply to certain forms of
business credit, 95 while the Fair Credit Reporting Act notifications
and requirements apply only to consumer credit. 96 In addition, the
definition of "adverse action" for notification purposes under Regulation B is both more precise and broader than the concept of adverse
action in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 97

It is obvious by its name that the Fair Credit Reporting Act deals
mainly with loan or credit information rather than account information. The definition of a "consumer report," however, is broad
enough to include account information if it bears on a "consumer's
credit worthiness" and may give the depository institution some protection in giving out account information that is unnecessary and
which the depository institution would not otherwise have.
making the report. See id. § 168In(a). In the latter situation, the consumer must make a
written request for the information after being so informed of this right. See id. § 1681n(b).
92. Id. §§ 1691-1691f (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
93. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1, pt. 202, app. A (1984). Regulation B is authorized by the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act. See id.
94. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 1, at 47 (1983).
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.3(a)(4) (1984); R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY
ch. 1, at 47 (1983).
96. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(d) (West 1982) (defines "consumer report"); Sizemore v.
Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Fair Credit Reporting Act does
not protect consumers in acquiring commercial credit); R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
PRIVACY ch. 1, at 47 (1983).
97. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1984). Adverse action under Regulation B is defined as:
(i) A refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms
requested by an applicant unless the creditor offers to grant credit other than in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested by the applicant and the applicant uses or expressly accepts the credit offered; or
(ii) A termination of an account or an unfavorable change in the terms of an account that
does not affect all or a substantial portion of a classification of a creditor's accounts; or
(iii) A refusal to increase the amount of credit available to an applicant when the applicant requests an increase in accordance with procedures established by the creditor for the
type of credit involved.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m (1982). The FCRA defines "adverse action" to be
"[w]henever credit or insurance for personal, family, or household purposes, or employment
involving a consumer is denied or the charge for such credit or insurance is increased either
wholly or partly because of information contained in a consumer report from a consumer
" Id. A more detailed analysis of either the Fair Credit Reporting Act
reporting agency ..
or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is not relevant to the discussion at hand.
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D. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act9" was passed in 1978 to provide
some measure of regulation for electronic systems established to
transfer funds.99 On March 28, 1979, the Federal Reserve Board

promulgated a detailed regulation for this purpose, known as Regula°° The provisions of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and
tion E."
Regulation E are comprehensive and detailed and beyond the scope of
this article. There is, however, the noteworthy requirement in each
that there be advance disclosure of the financial institution's privacy
policies. 1 The disclosure provisions of Regulation E appear to require the financial institution to disclose, in general terms, the situation in which, and the persons and entities to whom, it ordinarily will
disclose information concerning the customer's account.102
E. The Freedom of Information Act
Federal regulatory agencies compile vast quantities of information
submitted by financial institutions, most of which relates to individual
03
customers of such institutions. The Freedom of Information Act
was passed in 1966 and requires federal agencies to disclose information held in federal agency files upon request, unless that information
falls within one of nine specifically exempted categories.'° Under the
98. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
99. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978).
100. 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.14 (1984).
101. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693c(a) (West 1982) (Electronic Fund Transfer Act); 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.7 (1984) (Regulation E).
102. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.7(a) (1984). At least four situations warrant disclosure of financial information. See id., pt. 205, app. A, § A (7). Appendix A lists the following:
(1) Where it is necessary for completing transfers, or (2) In order to verify the existence
and condition of your account for a third party, such as a credit bureau or merchant, or

(3) In order to comply with government agency or court, orders, or (4) If you give us
your written permission.
Id.
103. 5 U.S.C.A.

§§

552-552b (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).

104. See id. § 552(a)(3) (West 1977). The nine exempted categories are: (1) matters that
are "established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or

foreign policy"; (2) matters that are solely related to the internal personnel procedures of an
agency; (3) matters exempted from disclosure by statutes; (4) trade secrets and privileged financial information; (5) inter- or intra-agency "memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency"; (6) personnel
and medical files; (7) investigation records compiled for law enforcement purposes, if the disclosure of such would interfere with enforcement activities or a fair trial; (8) matters "contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of,
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Freedom of Information Act there is a presumption in favor of disclosure,105 and, as a general rule, the nine exceptions are construed
10 6
narrowly.
F.

The Bank Examination Report

The policy of protecting the confidentiality of national bank examination reports dates back more than a century to the establishment of
the national banking examination system in 1864.107 Courts have
consistently upheld this confidentiality.10 8 The Comptroller of the
Currency has regulations which apply to requests for access to examination reports.10 9 These regulations deal with the specific request procedure applicable to all types of documents pursuant to the provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act.°10 Any lawyer attempting to discover national bank examination reports should carefully review these
regulations. As a practical matter, it is extremely difficult to compel
discovery of examination reports. 1
Article 342-210 of the Texas Banking Code establishes an absolute
privilege against the disclosure of the confidential section of state
bank examination reports.' 2 The Texas Savings and Loan Act also
or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions"; or (9) any geophysical or geological information, including maps, pertaining to wells.
See id. § 552(b).
105. See Moorefield v. United States Secret Serv., 611 F.2d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir.) (presumption of disclosure in FOIA suit), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 909 (1980); Niemier v. Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1977) (presumption of disclosure under
FOIA which is rebuttable by government).
106. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 726 (3rd Cir. 1982)
(nine exemptions under FOIA are to be exclusive and narrowly construed); Chamberlain v.
Alexander, 419 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (FOIA exceptions, to be "narrowly construed"), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 589 F.2d 827, 838-39 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
107. See National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 99-118 (1864) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-200 (West 1945 & Supp. 1984).
108. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 371, 372 (5th
Cir. 1969) (recognizing privilege of nondisclosure of bank examination reports); Overly v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 163 (5th Cir. 1955) (privilege not waived by
wrongful disclosure of bank examination reports by bank directors); Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (bank examination reports
are to be treated as confidential).
109. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.16-.19 (1984).
110. See id.
111. See Shockey, Discovery of Examination Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency,
11 FORUM 1241, 1247-51 (1976) (discussion of regulations and their administration).
112. See Stewart v. McCain, 575 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1978) (article 342-210 creates
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contains a similar provision.' 3 Neither the Texas Banking Commission nor the Texas Savings and Loan Commission have detailed regulations similar to those issued by the Comptroller of the Currency
relating to the procedure for "discovering" examination reports in
civil lawsuits.
V.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES

Unlike the United States Constitution, a few states specifically
guarantee a right to personal privacy in their constitutions." 4 One
such state is California."1 Relying on the California constitutional
provision, the California Supreme Court held that a depositor could
challenge a bank's unauthorized disclosure of his bank records as an
illegal search and seizure, when legal process was not given. 1 6 In
another case, the California Supreme Court construed the California
constitutional guarantee to require a bank not to disclose the customer's records to an unrelated third party pursuant to discovery in
civil litigation without first taking "reasonable steps to notify its cusabsolute privilege against disclosure of confidential information); see also TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Information in the Department of Banking's
bank examination reports is excepted from required public disclosure under the Open Records
Act (art. 6252-17a) by § 3(a)(1) of the Act, as information deemed confidential by art. 342-210,
and by § 3(a)(12) of the Open Records Act, as information contained in an examination report
prepared by an agency responsible for the supervision of financial institutions. See Tex. Att'y
Gen. ORD-147 (1976). Article 342-210 provides in part:
[A]ll information obtained by the Banking Department relative to the financial condition
of state banks other than call reports and profit and loss statements, whether obtained
through examination or otherwise, except published statements, and all files and records
of said Department relative thereto shall be confidential, and shall not be disclosed by the
Commissioner or any officer or employee of said Department. Further provided that no
such information shall be divulged to any member of the Finance Commission, nor shall
any member of the Finance Commission be given access to such files and records of the
Banking Department. ...
Id.
113. See id. art. 852a, § 11.18 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
114. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 5, at 5-7 (1983). Those
states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New
York, South Carolina, and Washington. See id. at 5. It is beyond the scope of this article to
analyze the constitutional provisions of these eleven states. The provision contained within the
constitution of Hawaii is typical: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a coipelling state interest." HAWAII CONST. art. I,
§ 6 (Supp. 1983).
115. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Deering 1981).
116. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 594-96, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-72
(1974).
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tomer of the pendency and nature of the proceedings and afford the
customer a fair opportunity to assert his interests."'I 7 Apparently, a
depository institution could be liable for damages if it improperly violates its customer's reasonable expectations of privacy under the Cali18
fornia Constitution.1
Texas is not the first state to pass a more detailed statute affecting
financial privacy;' 19 many states have specific statutes governing this
area. 120 The statutes of four states are similar to each other and to the
federal Financial Privacy Act. 12 1 The protection afforded by most
state statutes is limited to procedural safeguards only. 11 2 Only California explicitly requires a depository institution to balance the government's need for the information with the depositor's right of
privacy. 123 Although some state statutes, such as Texas' amended ar-

ticle 342-705, do create a notice and challenge procedure, 124 none give
117. See Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556

(1975).
118. Cf id. at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (bank must notify customer and allow customer
opportunity to object before disclosing confidential information).
119. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (Deering 1982 & Sifpp. 1985) (act passed
in 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 161-164 (1980) (act passed in 1977); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 192.550-.595 (1983) (act passed in 1977). The prior version of article 342-705, passed
in 1963, was too limited to be considered a financial privacy statute. It affected only "deposits" and the "amount deposited." See Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 440, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws
1135-36, amended by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571 (West 1983) (disclosure of personal credit
information); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 161-164 (1980) (confidential financial
records); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2201-2206 (West 1984) (financial privacy act); see also

R.

FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY

ch. 5, at 21-23 (1983). It is beyond the scope

of this article to analyze all of the various state statutes. They vary greatly as to the financial
institutions and customers covered, as well as with regard to the sanctions for violations. See
generally id. at 23-30.
121. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 239A (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-c (1981 Supp.); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 192.550-.595 (1983). These statutes all govern particular financial institutions as to the
disclosure of customer information to local and state government.
122. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571A (West 1983) (customer required to be
notified by bank before disclosure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2204 (West 1984) (customer
has 14 days after subpoena served to file motion to quash); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
342-705, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (financial institution required to give notice to customer
prior to disclosure).
123. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7461(c) (Deering 1982).
124. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2204 (West 1984) (notice of subpoena must be
given to customer on day served; customer then has 14 days to file motion to quash); OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.565 (1983) (customer must be given notice of subpoena; after notice received customer has 10 days to move to quash); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, §§ 2, 3
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the depositor a legally enforceable privacy right which can be asserted
in a challenge hearing. In other words, informal government access
to bank records is merely replaced by a formalized legal process.
VI.

COMMON-LAW DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY

For a number of years, banks have been sued for giving out information about customers, sometimes even regardless of whether such
information is inaccurate or misleading.' 25 The next part of this article traces the historical development of the common-law theories used
as a basis for these lawsuits.
A.

Invasion of Privacy

One of the first common-law theories developed to provide some
protection of financial privacy arose as a general privacy right under
tort law. 126 This tort common law was sparked by a famous law review article published by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890.127 By 1960, Dean William Prosser had subdivided this tort into
four categories. "1. [i]ntrusion upon a [person's] seclusion or solitude,
or into his private affairs[;] 2. [p]ublic disclosure or embarrassing private facts about the [person;] 3. [p]ublicity which places the [person]
in a false light in the public eye[; and] 4. [a]ppropriation, for the de'
fendant's advantage, of the [person's] name or likeness. "128
Texas cases have also adopted the general privacy right under tort
law.' 29 The heart of the privacy theory lies in the protection not
merely of false or embarrassing information, but of all information
(Vernon Supp. 1984) (after customer receives notice he may move to quash up until 10 days
before compliance is required).
125. See, e.g., Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 462;
Milochnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho
First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 286 (Idaho 1961).
126. See generally Warren & Brandies, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193220 (1890) (famous article arguing for "right to be left alone").
127. See id. at 193.
128. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
129. See, e.g., Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973) (action may be
maintained for invasion of right to privacy); National Bonding Agency v. Demenson, 648
S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (invasion of privacy actionable tort in
Texas); Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1952, no writ) (Texas courts apply right to privacy).
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that the person desires to be kept confidential for any reason. 130 The
current impact, if any, of the doctrine of invasion of privacy probably
affects the procedure by which depository institutions collect information. In other words, a depository institution could be liable if it collects information on a customer in an unreasonably intrusive
manner.13 1 The doctrine of invasion of privacy, however, has been
replaced in the financial privacy area by a number of the statutes discussed earlier, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Today, the
doctrine of invasion of privacy is little more than a last resort or a
separate source132of relief for those who can obtain no help from applicable statutes.
B. Implied Contract
A second common-law theory still in use today is the theory of
implied contract. Under this theory, a depository institution has an
implied agreement with its customer that the depository institution
will keep the financial affairs of the customer confidential. 133 This implied contract doctrine was raised in England as far back as the 1850's
and later affirmed in the leading English case of Tournier v. National
Provincialand Union Bank, decided in 1924.134 Tournier was a customer of National Provincial and Union Bank of England, and received a check from another customer of that bank, which he
endorsed to a bookie. An employee of the bank noticed the endorsement and reported it to Tournier's employer. When Tournier's employment contract expired, it was not renewed. Tournier sued the
bank, claiming that it breached a duty to him not to disclose to any
third person any information it had acquired about him. 135 The jury
found for the bank, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the
obligation of secrecy was an implied term of the contract between the
130. See Milner v. Red River. Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1952, no writ) (right of privacy defined as person's "right to be let alone").
131. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 5, at 8 (1983). The circum-

stances determine what is reasonable, but most courts are reluctant to find an invasion of
privacy within the parameters of the ordinary course of business. See id. at 8.
132. See id. at 9.
133. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1969); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408
A.2d 758, 764 (Md. App. 1979).
134. See Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
135. See id. at 461-62.
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bank and the depositor. 136
The English court qualified its general statement of legal duty with
four broad exceptions:
1. "Where disclosure under compulsion by law," as under
subpoena;
2. "[W]here there is a duty to the public to disclose;"
3. "[W]here the interests of the bank require disclosure;" and
4. "[W]here the disclosure
is made by the express or implied con137
sent of the customer."'
In America, the doctrine was first accepted in the case of Peterson v.
Idaho First National Bank 138 Peterson was a local manager for a finance company. His management of his personal business was less
than ideal; he wrote hot checks on his account at Idaho First National
Bank. A banker at Idaho First wrote a letter to Peterson's boss in
Denver, telling the boss that Peterson's personal finances were a mess,
that they were the subject of unfavorable criticism in the community,
and that the bank had returned a large number of checks NSF. 1.39 We
are left to assume that Peterson lost his job as a result of such disclosures. Peterson sued Idaho First for breach of implied contract."4
The Supreme Court of Idaho, taking its law indirectly from the
Tournier case, stated in favor of the implied contract doctrine:
It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at
liberty to disclose the intimate details of its depositors' accounts. Inviolate secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or depositors ...
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no information may be disclosed by the bank or its employees
concerning the customer's or depositor's account, and that, unless authorized by law or by customer or depositor, the bank must be held
liable for breach of the implied contract. The claimed discretionary
power assumed by the bank manager did not dispense with the necessity

136. See id. at 472-73.
137. See id. at 473.
138. 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961).
139. See id. at 286.
140. Cf id. at 288. Actually, the plaintiff brought an action for the invasion of a depositor's right to privacy. See id. at 286. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action under this claim. See id. at 288. The court then held, however, that the plaintiff's claim
did state a cause of action under an implied contract theory. See id. 289.
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of assent by the customer or depositor.141
A few years later, in Milohnich v. FirstNationalBank, 142 Milohnich
sued the First National Bank of Miami Springs. 143 Milohnich's complaint was that the bank had given out information about an account
in which he had an interest, with the result that third parties to whom
the information was given sued Milohnich and others on three separate occasions. The third parties were able to freeze the defendants'
bank accounts pending the outcome of the suit. 1" The case is not
clear as to the procedure followed, but it may be similar to garnishment proceedings in Texas. The Florida court cited the Tournierand
Peterson cases and agreed that there is a "qualified duty of non-disclosure."14' 5 In addition, the Florida court cited other authorities, including the opinion of counsel for the American Bankers Association,
who stated that: "A bank should, as a general policy, consider information concerning its customers as confidential, which it should not
disclose to others without clear justification." '46 The court limits its
opinion to the facts before it, but there is little question that it clearly
recognized a duty of the type referred to in the Tournierand Peterson

cases. 147
The Tourniercase, with its holding that there is an implied contract
that a bank will not divulge any information about its customers'
business except with the customer's consent or in any other very restricted circumstances, stalks the land. To date there is no Texas case
specifically on this point. But at least one judge of the federal appellate court which hears cases arising in Texas, the Fifth Circuit, has
cited both Milohnich and Peterson favorably in the case of Price v.
Wirtz, 148 a case not involving bank disclosure. 149
141. Id. at 290.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1969).
See id. at 759-60.
See id. at 760.
See id. at 760-61.
See id. at 761.
See id. at 760-62.

148. 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969). Both Milohnich and Peterson were cited by Judge

Dyer in the dissenting opinion. See id. at 654 (7-5 decision) (Dyer, J., dissenting).
149. Price is a labor relations case discussing an issue arising under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. See id. at 647-48.
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Defamation

The common-law doctrine of defamation protects individuals and
150
businesses against the publication of false information about them.
The law of defamation has at least two major limitations in protecting
financial privacy. The first is that proof of the truth of any alleged
defamatory matter is a complete defense to a defamation suit.II Secondly, the law of defamation protects a customer only against the dissemination of false information and not against dissemination 1of2
information that the customer only wishes to be kept confidential.
In addition, under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, courts require defamation plaintiffs who are "public figures" to
prove that defamatory information was 5disseminated
with reckless in3
difference to its truthfulness or falsity.1
VII.

SELF-POLICING OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS

The Robert Morris Associates, founded in 1914, is a national association of bank commercial loan and credit officers." 4 In 1980, 2100
150. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 771
(5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (defamation
defined as unprivileged communication of false statements that result in harm to another), cert.
denied, 279 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1973); McGowen v. Prentice, 341 So. 2d 55, 57 (La. Ct. App. 1976)

(statement which exposes person to hatred, obloquy, ridicule, or contempt is defamation); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex.) (individual may recover damage
from publisher of defamatory falsehood upon showing that publisher knew or should have
known statement was false), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976).
151. See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press, 609 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir. 1980) (accurate accounts of reporter's conversation could not be defamatory); Bell v. Gayle, 384 F. Supp.
1022, 1027 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (newspaper article stated truth so no defamation of character);
Hoxsey v. Fishbein, 83 F. Supp. 282, 282 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (Texas statute allows defense of
truthfulness of accusations).
152. See Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex.) (proof of defamation requires false statement), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976); A.H. Belo Corp. v.
Rayzor, 644 S.W.2d 71, 79 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (false statement
essential element of defamation).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283
(1963); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1976).
154. See ROBERT MORRIS ASSOCIATES, CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT INFORMATION BETWEEN BANKS 1 (Apr. 1980). The code of ethics is published in pamphlet form by Robert Morris Associates and can be ordered from: Robert Morris
Associates National Office, 1616 Philadelphia National Bank Building, Philadelphia, PA

19107.
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banks were represented in the association by over 8200 commercial
loan and credit officers from fifty states, Puerto Rico, Canada, and
Panama. 55 The association was organized to facilitate the flow and
interchange of credit information. 56 Since 1916, the association has
maintained a code of ethics for the exchange of commerical credit
information between banks."5 " The latest revised code of ethics was
published in October 1976 and mailed to every member of the association, as well as to the 5chief
executive officer of every commercial bank
8
in the United States.1

While the code of ethics is admirable, it has several drawbacks.
First, it basically applies only to the exchange of commercial credit
information and is aimed more at the lending rather than the depositing function of banks.' 9 Secondly, the only sanction for violation of
the code of ethics by member banks is that their membership in the
association may be terminated pursuant to the association's bylaws. 160
Third, membership
does not include credit unions and savings and
6'
loan personnel.'
155. See id. at 1
156. See id. at 1.
157. See id. at 2.
158. See id. at 1.
159. See id. at 1.
160. See id. at 4.
161. See id. at 1. Many banks also have detailed internal policy statements regarding the
release of customer information. Such policy statements may include elements of the code of
ethics. For example, Chemical New York Corp. has an elaborate policy manual which was
described in a speech delivered by Duncan C. Smith, Deputy General Counsel, Chemical
Bank, New York, New York, to the American Bar Ass'n, in Chicago, on August 7, 1984. This
speech was entitled Privacyand TransborderData Flow Issues In A Large FinancialInstitution.
The part of the Chemical Manual relevant to this dicussion reads as follows:
Staff members must not divulge any material non-public information regarding the
Corporation to any outsider. Staff members must maintain the confidential relationship
between the Corporation and each of its customers. Confidentiality is a fundamental principle of the financial business. Confidential information, such as account balances, financial information obtained from a customer, or anticipated changes in the management or
financial condition of a customer, must never be discussed outside the normal and necessary course of the Corporation's business.
This prohibition against discussing customer information applies especially to passing
of such information to other entities or divisions of the Corporation, such as World Banking Group to Trust and Investment Division, or vice versa. The Corporation's written
policy requires that a "trust" wall must be constantly maintained between the commercial
and the trust sides of the Corporation. The primary purpose is to prevent Trust and
Investment officers from making investment decisions based upon confidential information received from the commercial side of the Bank.
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VIII.

THE PRESENT RIGHTS OF THE CUSTOMER OF A
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION TO FINANCIAL RECORD
PRIVACY

As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, all of the statutory
and common-law rights given to the customer relating to financial
privacy have some drawbacks. By and large, the federal statutes and
amended article 342-705 are procedural in nature only. Even though
a customer of a depository institution may not have a privacy right in
his bank records, at least these statutes give the customer a procedural
opportunity to find out that he does not have such rights.
In addition, the statutes suffer from other limitations. For example,
the Financial Privacy Act has limited coverage, in that its restrictions
apply only to federal agencies, not to state and local authorities or to
private individuals and organizations. 162 The Act also protects only
individuals and partnerships of five or fewer members, exchiding
larger partnerships, corporations, trusts, or other legal entities.163
The greatest drawback of all, however, is that the Act does not create
a legally enforceable right of privacy in bank records.16 Without this
right, the customer's position is limited to the assertion of procedural
safeguards or relevancy issues in compliance with the Act. The result
is that, in most cases, the customer has an inability to prevent
disclosure.
In addition, each of the common-law theories which has been used
to claim a right of confidentiality in bank records has some drawback.
The implied contract theory, discussed in part, has been followed by
several American cases.165 However, the difficulty is that a great deal
of discretion is given to the bank to determine what is in the public or
its own interest. As a result, the court in Suburban Trust Company v.
Wailer16 6 was able to reject the Tournier standards in preference for a
more restrictive standard of disclosure, limited only to disclosure

See Speech by Duncan C. Smith to the American Bar Ass'n, Privacy and TransborderData
Flow Issues In A Large FinancialInstitution, 175, in Chicago (Aug. 7, 1984).
162. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401(3), 3402 (West 1980).

163. See id. § 3401(4).
164. See id. § 3410.
165. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1969); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408
A.2d 758, 764 (Md. App. 1979).
166. 408 A.2d 758 (Md. App. 1979).
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compelled by law or consented to by the depositor.' 67 A tort theory
based on invasion of the depositor's right of privacy has been advanced, but with little practical success. 168 Defamation requires publication beyond one person in order to recover for public disclosure of

a private fact.' 69 The action must also meet an "outrageous conduct"

or embarrassment standard. 7 ° This is rarely the case in banking rec-

ord disclosures. Although many states, including Texas, now recognize a common-law right to privacy, this right might not extend to
financial institution records. In addition, a tort cause of action does
not include the possibility of recovering punitive damages.
A final theory of common-law confidentiality which has been asserted is an evidentiary privilege similar to the well established attor-

ney-client or husband-wife privilege. This theory has been repeatedly
rejected in the federal courts.17 1 The concept of a banker-depositor
privilege has fared little better under state law. 172 No state has codified such a privilege, and the courts have been reluctant to judicially
adopt new ones. 173

Of course, the depositor could insist that the depository institution
contract in the deposit agreement not to disclose information about

the depositor's account. The American Civil Liberties Union has proposed a bank deposit agreement for this express purpose.174 The use-

fulness of such a contract right would be limited, however, to
instances where it did not conflict with legal compulsion to disclose.
Such a conflict arose in Jacobson v. Citizens State Bank, 17 5 in which

the depositor sued its bank for disclosing account records contrary to
167. See id. at 765.
168. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 5, at 9 (1983) (doctrine

used as last resort).
169. See McGuire v. Adkins, 226 So. 2d 659, 661 (Ala. 1969); Louka v. Park Entertainments, 1 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Mass. 1936).
170. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 11, at 774
(5th ed. 1984).
171. See United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1976) (banker-depositor
privilege does not exist in federal courts); United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 417 F.
Supp. 389, 391-92 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (federal courts do not recognize banker-depositor privilege).
172. See Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 979-80, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556
(1975) (refusing to adopt banker-depositor privilege).
173. See id. at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (since legislature has not enacted banker-depositor privilege, court refuses to judicially adopt such privilege).
174. Zimmerman, ACLU Drafts Model Bank-Customer ContractAimed at ProtectingPrivacy of Accounts, Am. Banker, July 27, 1972.
175. 587 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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his prior oral and written instructions to keep the account confidential. 17 6 Such instructions had been recorded on the signature card.
When the I.R.S. served a summons for the customer's record on the
bank, the customer requested that they be withheld unless a court
order was obtained. The bank complied with the summons, however,
over the objections of its customer. The court found no liability, holdto the bank's
ing that the customer's right of privacy was subordinate
17 7
I.R.C.
the
of
7602
duty to comply with section
IX.

SHOULD THE CUSTOMER HAVE MORE RIGHTS TO
FINANCIAL RECORD PRIVACY?

As discussed above, diversity characterizes not only the sources,
but also the type of protection offered by laws affecting the right to
financial record privacy in the United States. This diversity of content is also true in privacy law in general. The diversity of content
reflects the complexity of the modem idea of privacy and the pragmatic approach generally applied by lawmakers in the United States.
Very little distinction has been made in the statutes between account information and loan information. It is easy to argue that there
should be a distinction between these two types of information. After
all, when the customer approaches a creditor for a loan, it is only
natural to assume that the customer has impliedly authorized the
creditor to check with other creditors regarding the potential customer in order to protect itself. There is, however, surprisingly little
statutory authority on this point. Regulation B, issued by the Federal
Reserve Board under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, contains
model credit application forms which contain a statement above the
customer's signature as follows: "You are authorized to check my
credit and employment history and to answer questions about your
credit experience with me."'17 Inclusion of this sentence in the model
form may have simply been intended as a reminder to the customer of
the preexisting right of the creditor. This is evidenced by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act for consumers and some case law for other borrowers.' 7 9 On the other hand, the drafters of Regulation B may have
176. See id. at 481.
177. See id. at 481-82.
178. 12 C.F.R., pt. 202, app. 50 (1984).

179. See Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd 411
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felt that it was necessary to confer such right upon the lender. It is
more likely that the former is the case.
The situation in the United States is very different from that in Europe. In the United States, with a largely mobile population, it is very
common for one person to deal with numerous creditors at one time.
Significantly, the average person deals with literally hundreds of creditors throughout his lifetime. Thus, in a very mobile society, such as
the United States, it is necessary for "Macy's to talk to Gimbel's" to
protect itself. On the other hand, in Europe, it has been traditional
for one person to deal with a single creditor for most of his life. As a
result, in Switzerland there are very strict bank secrecy laws. 8 0
Perhaps a better argument can be made for more right to financial
record privacy in regard to the account relationship. Before one can
propose legislation regarding the substantive rights to financial record
privacy in the account relationship, however, it is necessary to analyze
the current philosophical arguments raging in the privacy area in general. After all, financial record privacy is only part of a bigger public
policy issue currently being discussed throughout the world. This issue involves the argument as to how much privacy is necessary in a
technologically complex world in order to maintain basic human
rights.
X.

PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Privacy was clearly identified as a human rights issue a decade ago
by a United Nations conference.' 8 ' Many advocates of privacy allege
that it is endangered by automation. 8 2 The differences between the
reaction to this alleged threat in the European countries and in the
United States is drastic. Several European countries have enacted
N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1978) (borrower would not normally expect loan information to be
kept confidential).
180. It is interesting to note that Swiss bankers are being called upon to defend their
famous numbered accounts more and more. However, the voters in Switzerland recently rejected a proposal to change the bank secrecy laws by a 70% margin. See Anders & Studer,
Switzerland's Banking Gnomes Aren't the Magnet They Once Were for International Cash
Hoards, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1985, at 28; Parry, In Defense of Famed Secrecy, Swiss Bankers
Attach 'Myths, AM. BANKER, Jan. 4, 1985, at 2; Parry, Swiss Bankers Criticize Effort To Revive Anti-Secrecy Plan, AM. BANKER, Dec. 5, 1984, at 2; Swiss Secrets Are Put to a Vote, TIME,
May 28, 1984, at 69.
181. See Coombe, Jr. & Kirk, Privacy, Data Protection, and TransborderData Flow: A
Corporate Response to InternationalExpectations, 39 Bus. LAW. 33, 37 (1983).
182. See id. at 37.
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broad privacy laws to protect personal data."8 3 The European Economic Community and the Counsel of Europe have debated the issue."8 4 In September 1980, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted guidelines governing
the protection of privacy and transborder flow of personal data. 18 5
The guidelines, applicable to both governmental and private records
systems,1 8 6 recommend that signatory countries adhere to eight principles in connection with the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data.187 These eight principles are described as "minimum
standards," which are capable of being supplemented by additional
18
measures for the protection of privacy and the individual liberties.
Paragraph 19 of the guidelines recommends that in implementing the
principles of privacy protection, "member countries should establish
legal, administrative or other procedures or institutions for the protection of privacy and individual liberties in respect of personal

data."18 9
This article discussed the legal aspects of privacy protection in the
United States as they apply to financial records. In addition, there are
numerous other statutes, regulations, and constitutional mandates
which affect privacy in other areas.' 9° Many of these relate to actions
183. See id. at 37.
184. See id. at 37.
185. See Recommendations of the Council Governing the Protection of Privacy and TransborderFlows of PersonalData, OECD Doc. c(80) 58 (Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in R. FISCHER,
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 6, at 32 (1983). An early consideration of the guidelines is found in 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 241, 241-47 (1981). The recommendations were adopted
at the Council's 523d meeting in Paris, on Sept. 23, 1980. See id. at 241 n.1.
186. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 6, at 46 (1983) (explanation
of paragraph 2 of guidelines); see also Recent Development, TransborderDataFlows: Personal
Data, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 241, 241 (1981).
187. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 6, at 29-30 (1983) (part two
of guideline's annex); see also Recent Development, TransborderData Flows: PersonalData,
22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 241, 242 (1981).
188. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 6, at 29 (1983) (guidelines
state they are minimum standards); see also Recent Development, TransborderData Flows:
PersonalData, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 241, 242 (1981) (eight principles are minimum standards).
189. See R. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ch. 6, at 31 (1983) (paragraph
19 reprinted).
190. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 603(c) (West 1985) (invasion of privacy exception to public
access of Congressional Budget Office data); 18 U.S.C.A. § 5038 (West Supp. Pamph. 1984)
(records of juvenile delinquency proceedings safeguarded from disclosure); 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232g (West 1978 & Supp. 1984) (privacy rights of parents and students regarding inspection
of education records).
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by government agencies.19 ' For example, violations of constitutional
safeguards, such as those secured by the first, fourth, and fifth amendments, may subject the government agency official to a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief and/or money damages.1 92 The Privacy Act
requires agencies of the federal government to assure that records
used to make a "determination" about an individual are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete "as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual.""19 Agencies are required to publish a detailed
annual notice in the Federal Register that describes each record system, the kind of information maintained, its source, the policies governing management of the system, and the procedures for obtaining
access to records about oneself.1 94 Finally, the Financial Privacy Act
requires agencies, on request, to provide individuals access to records
and an opportunity to correct or challenge the contents of the
record.1 95
Many other specific privacy laws in the United States could be discussed. For example, enforcement of the Family Education and Privacy Rights Act is achieved primarily through the right of students
and their parents to inspect and challenge education records.1 96 Additionally, administrative enforcement of the Act is vested in the Department of Education, and the Act provides for termination of
federal funds if an institution violates its terms and compliance cannot
1 97
be secured voluntarily.
None of the privacy statutes in the United States, however, are
comparable with the unitary schemes of regulations adopted by many

191. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (West Supp. 1984) (privacy rights of individuals regarding inspection of education records); 12 C.F.R. pt. 505a (1984) (privacy rights of individuals regarding records maintained by Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 29 C.F.R. pt.
70(a)(1984) (privacy rights of individuals regarding records maintained by Secretary of Labor).
192. See, e.g., Katy v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (fourth amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusions); Tehan v. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 416 (fifth amendment reflects Constitution's concern for right of individuals "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life"); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964) (governmental purpose to prevent activities may not be achieved by broad means which
invade privacy rights under first amendment).
193. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(5) (West 1977).
194. See id. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(I) (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
195. See id. § 552a(d) (West 1977).
196. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (West 1978 & Supp. 1984).

197. See id.
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countries of continental Europe.1 98 The question arises as to what
further legislative steps, if any, are required in the personal privacy
area in the United States. The difference in attitudes appears to turn
on how one reacts to the new information technologies. In a speech
given by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont to the American Bar Association at Chicago, Senator Leahy said:
As we march into the era of the information society, we must update
our laws to protect our rights to privacy. But we should never do so in
a way which compromises our right to free speech, our right to a free
press, our right to assemble, or our right to know.
We cannot allow the loss of personal privacy to serve as an excuse for
the creation of greater government secrecy.
Right now, the National Security Council, with the help of the Defense Department and the National Security Agency, is undertaking a
major review of ways to strengthen the security -and privacy of the nation's telecommunications and automated information systems. My
foregoing remarks must make it clear that I think that the topic of the
review is one worthy of study. But given the players who are conducting the review, I am hardly sanguine that personal privacy will top
the list of concerns being addressed by the study.
In changing policies and changing laws, we should not worry excessively about making the United States an information society. That will
happen for us, no matter what we do-just as it will in Japan, in Europe, and even in the Soviet Union. What we must worry about, and
worry about excessively, is how we create an information democracy.
The first step towards that information democracy is to reverse the current trend of making government information less accessible to citizens,
and information about citizens more accessible to government and
businesses. 199

On the other hand, in an article that appeared in the Washington
Monthly, in May 1984, Mr. Philip Keisling stated:
A centralized 'dossier' system that could be instantly accessible to
anyone with the right computer access code is a disquieting thought.
But there's an important distinction that privacy advocates usually
overlook when they argue, in effect, that an inefficient government is
necessary for the preservation of basic freedoms. Basically, civil liber-

198. See Coombe, Jr. & Kirk, Privacy, Data Protection, and TransborderData Flow: A
CorporateResponse to InternationalExpectations, 39 Bus. LAW. 33, 38 (1983).

199. See Speech by Senator Patrick Leahy to the American Bar Assn., Privacy 1984, at 4,
in Chicago (Aug. 7, 1984).
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tarians imply that a major difference between a democracy and police
state is whether information can be retrieved at the touch of one button,
or whether it takes two days to assemble by rummaging through several
dozen different files. But the real difference lies in what the information
consists of, and what it is then used for.2"
XI.

CONCLUSION

Procedural safeguards are of course important. It is important that
a customer of a depository institution be aware of when and to whom
his financial records are being released. For this reason, amended article 342-705 should be extended to apply to credit unions and savings
and loan associations as well as to banks. The easiest way to accomplish this might be for Texas to simply pass a law similar to the Financial Privacy Act which applies to state agencies, as well as to
parties seeking private information.
As to substantive rights to prevent such information release, it is
arguable that the customer should have less rights regarding loan experience information disclosed to other creditors than he would have
in more confidential information, such as account balances, financial
information he has supplied the bank about himself, or anticipated
changes in his management or financial condition. Any legislative attempts to address the area of what should be confidential is very complex and difficult to draft. Legislation would have to balance the need
of government and industry for information with the depositor's right
of privacy. Perhaps we in this country should adopt more comprehensive privacy statutes, as has been done in Europe. Until then, the
best protection for the customer regarding financial privacy is to deal
with a depository institution which has a well thought out written
manual and code of ethics applying to the disclosure of both account
and loan information. Unfortunately, the customer's real sanction if
the depository institution violates such policy or code of ethics is to
take his business elsewhere.
It is difficult to predict which course financial privacy will take in
the United States. Federal law enforcement officials have announced
an interagency agreement among the Justice Department, the F.B.I.,
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan
200. Keisling, The Case Against Privacy, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1984, at 25.
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Bank Board to make criminal referrals to other law enforcement
agencies without notice to customers." 1 This is sure to cause debate
regarding the proper balance between the need for the government to
prevent and combat crime and the right to privacy.

201. See Rosenstein, Federal Lawmen Trying to Pierce Veil Shielding Bank Records of
Individuals, AM. BANKER, Apr. 3, 1985, at 16.
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